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ABSTRACT 
 
QI WANG: Trade-Off between Hard and Soft Information in Bank Lending  
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman) 
 
Focusing on the syndicated loan market, this paper investigates the extent to 
which lending decisions of lead banks incorporate trade-offs between access to a 
borrower’s soft, internal information and the quality of the borrower’s financial 
accounting information. Building on substantial finance and economics literature, this 
study uses the geographic distance between the borrower and the lead bank as a proxy for 
the bank’s access to soft information acquisition. Prior research finds that the more 
distant the borrower is from the bank, the more difficult it is for the bank to obtain soft 
information for monitoring. This paper documents that the distance between the borrower 
and the lead bank increases with the quality of accounting information, suggesting that 
lead banks viewing high quality accounting information as a substitute for internal 
information. Further, this trade-off between accounting information and soft information 
is amplified for borrowers with more opaque information environments. Finally, it is 
documented that for borrowers without a high-reputation bank located in their geographic 
area, higher quality accounting information increases the probability that a borrower 
transacts with a geographically remote reputable lead bank. Overall, the results suggest 
that the availability of high-quality accounting information increases the set of potential 
contracting counterparties by creating the opportunity for borrowers to transcend the 
limits of geography and seek lending relationships with geographically remote banks.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Information asymmetry creates frictions that can substantially impact the 
contracting terms and direct costs of raising external funds in credit markets. Audited 
financial accounting information represents a fundamental source of credible, firm-
specific information that plays a central role in mitigating information asymmetries 
across contracting parties. A significant literature in accounting and finance examines the 
role of accounting information in influencing key aspects of debt contract design 
including debt covenants, interest spreads, syndicate structure, and debt maturity, among 
others (see Armstrong et al. (2010) for a review). However, there is little research that 
investigates the role of financial accounting information in determining how borrowers 
are matched with potential lending banks. In other words, the effect of financial 
accounting information on firms’ likelihood of getting loans from potential lenders is 
relatively less explored. Focusing on the syndicated loan market, this paper extends the 
literature by investigating the extent to which lending decisions of lead banks incorporate 
trade-offs between access to a borrower’s soft, internal information and the quality of the 
borrower’s financial accounting information. 
 Syndicated loans are those that are provided by a number of lenders and are 
structured, arranged and administrated by one or several commercial or investment banks 
know as lead arrangers (Standard & Poor’s, 2010). These arrangers serve the investment-
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banking role by raising capital for issuers from investors. They gather information about 
the borrower, search for participants of the lending syndicate and coordinate all 
negotiations. Participants of loan syndications include banks, financial companies and 
institutional investors. Each member of the lending syndicate has a separate claim on the 
borrower (not necessarily in equal amounts), but is governed by the same loan contract. 
Syndicated loans are usually structured in deals (or packages) of multiple loans (or 
facilities) with various maturities and repayment schedules. Once a deal of syndicated 
loan is executed, lead arrangers act as monitors of the borrowing firm’s compliance of 
contractual terms and as administrators on behalf of syndicate participants with respect to 
payment collection, contract renegotiation and so on. Besides earning interests on 
syndicated loans as other participants, lead arrangers charge the borrowing firms 
significant fees which increase with the complexity and riskiness of the syndicated loan.1
 Building on substantial finance and economics literature, I use the geographic 
distance between the borrower and the lead bank as a proxy for the bank’s access to soft 
information acquisition. Economic theory posits that banks are special in terms of their 
ability to collect and process information to monitor borrowers, especially soft, 
qualitative information that is difficult to reduce to hard numbers or to easily 
communicate to those outside the firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Fama, 1985; Diamond, 
1984, 1991; Petersen, 2004).
 
2
                                                     
1 See Wittenberg-Moerman (2008) and Ball et al. (2008) for detail discussions of syndicated loan markets.  
 A number of studies have established that geographic 
2 Petersen (2004) describes hard information as “quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, 
and its content is independent of the collection process.” For example, credit cards are issued solely on the 
basis of analyzing quantitative and easily verifiable information, such as age, profession, and address of the 
applicant (Ausubel 1991). On the contrary, soft information is not easily or accurately reducible to a 
numerical score or is unable to be transmitted to the broader lending market. Such soft information may 
include the ability of the manager, their honesty, the way they react under pressure. For example, the 
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distance between the bank and the borrower is a key determinant of the bank’s ability to 
gather soft information for monitoring (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006). It has been shown that the more distant the borrower is from the bank, 
the more difficult it is for the bank to obtain soft information for monitoring. As a result, 
the borrower is less likely to get loans from the geographically remote bank (Agarwal and 
Hauswald, 2010). However, access to publicly available hard information can lower 
information asymmetry and potentially attenuate the demand for soft information, which 
may increase the probability of borrowing from the geographically remote bank.  
 In this paper, I focus on financial accounting information as a premier source of 
hard information, and investigate whether or not the quality of the borrower’s accounting 
information decreases lending banks’ demand for soft information. Specifically, I 
examine the relationship between accounting information quality and lender-borrower 
geographic distance in syndicated loan decisions. I hypothesize that higher quality 
accounting information creates scope for firms to forge lending relationships with 
geographically remote lenders that would be unavailable in the absence of such hard 
information. I further hypothesize that the trade-off between accounting quality and 
distance in lending decisions is amplified for borrowers with more opaque information 
environments. 
 To further the study, I investigate the extent to which accounting information 
quality facilitates the ability of borrowers without a high reputation bank located in their 
geographic area to transact with a geographically remote reputable lead bank. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a, 1994b) show theoretically that higher reputation banks 
                                                                                                                                                              
lending officer, through prior dealings with the firm manager, may learn to tell from the latter’s behavior 
when a loan request is justified and when it is not (Uzzi, 1999).    
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devote relatively more resources than lower reputation banks for ex ante evaluation and 
ex post monitoring of borrowing firms. Ross (2010) documents empirically that firms 
borrowing from high reputation banks experience more favorable stock price responses to 
loan announcements than firms borrowing from low reputation banks, and this is 
especially the case for opaque firms. Taken together, this literature suggest that firms 
strictly prefer to borrow from reputable banks since they benefit from the stricter 
screening and monitoring that mitigates the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders. Further, Ross (2010) and Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) find that 
the proximity of borrowers to lenders matters for the likelihood of getting a loan from a 
reputable bank. Building on this literature, I hypothesize that for firms not close to a high 
reputation bank, higher quality of accounting information increases the probability that a 
firm borrows from a geographically remote reputable lead bank. 
 However, there is no consensus in the accounting literature on how to measure 
accounting “quality” (Dechow, Schrand and Ge, 2010). Prior research on debt contracting 
has focused on a number of distinct attributes of accounting quality (Armstrong et al., 
2010; Beatty, 2008).  These attributes of quality include measures of accruals quality 
(Bharath et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; Balakrishnan, 2010), the timeliness of 
accounting information (Beatty et al., 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008), and the debt 
contracting value of accounting (Ball et al., 2008; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2011). Since 
resolving the issue of the best measure of accounting quality is beyond the scope of this 
paper, I use a number of key measures estimated at both the industry and firm-specific 
level that have been previously used in the debt literature. For the primary measure, I 
create an indicator equal to one if the debt contracting value of accounting (DCV) is 
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greater or equal to sample median and zero otherwise. I follow Ball et al. (2008) to 
estimate DCV, which is conceptualized as the ability of publicly reported accounting data 
to predict deteriorations in the credit quality of a borrower on a timely basis. DCV is 
measured at the Fama-French 48 industry-level as the R-square from the regression of the 
changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) 3 on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in 
quarterly earnings. 4 I also examine additional properties of accounting information 
commonly used in the literature, such as timeliness and accrual quality.5
 Using data of syndicated loans in the U.S. for the period of 1987 to 2006, the 
trade-off between accounting information and soft information is examined by regressing 
geographic distance on accounting quality measures and a vector of deal-specific and 
firm-specific controls. Consistent with prior literature, distance is measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the physical distance between the lender and the borrower 
(Petersen and Rajan, 2002). The lender-borrower distance is defined as the distance 
between the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the 
syndicated loan. Using various sources (e.g., Dealscan, Compustat, company websites, 
the FDIC website), I identified the zip codes of both the borrower’s and the lender’s 
 
                                                     
3 Vassalou and Xing (2004) calculate default likelihood for individual firms using Merton’s (1974) option 
pricing model, in which the equity of a firm is viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets where equity 
holders are residual claimants on the firm’s assets after all other obligations have been met. 
  
4 An alternative DCV measures is estimated for robustness. Following Ecker et al. (2011), TADCV is 
measured by first grouping firms based on lagged total assets, and then using the R-square from regressions 
of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly 
earnings within each group. Please refer to Section 4 for details. 
 
5 Timeliness is the extent to which current earnings capture the information set underlying 
contemporaneous changes in stock price and is estimated at the Fama-French 48 industry level as the R-
square from regressions of market-adjusted returns on quarterly earnings levels and seasonally differenced 
quarterly earnings. I create an indicator equal to one if timeliness measure is greater or equal to sample 
median and zero otherwise. Following Francis et al. (2005), the accrual quality is measured as the firm-
level standard deviation of residuals from the estimation of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model modified 
by McNicols (2002).  
 6 
 
headquarters. Next, I determined the corresponding latitude and longitude for each zip 
code and calculated distance using these coordinates of each location. 
 This study documents that the distance between the borrower and the lead bank 
increases with the various measures of accounting quality. I also find that this trade-off 
between accounting information and soft information is amplified for borrowers with 
more opaque information environments. Using a range of measures as proxies for the 
information environment of the borrower, 6
 Finally, I extend the conclusions of the previous analysis to examine the extent to 
which accounting quality increases the prospects for geographically isolated firms to 
have their syndicated loans arranged by a high reputation bank. Following the literature 
(Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011), I use a bank’s market share in the 
syndicated loan market to measure the reputation of the lead bank. I then create an 
indicator variable set equal to one if the borrower does not have a high reputation bank 
located in their geographic area. Ross (2010) and Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman 
(2011) show that such borrowers are significantly less likely to transact with a high 
reputation lead bank. Consistent with the earlier findings in this paper, I document that 
 this paper shows that the positive relationship 
between accounting quality and borrower-lender proximity is significantly larger for 
more opaque borrowers. Overall, the results suggest that the availability of high quality 
accounting information increases the set of potential contracting counterparties by 
creating the opportunity for borrowers to transcend the limits of soft information 
acquisition defined by geography and seek lending relationships with geographically 
remote banks. 
                                                     
6 Measures of borrowing firms’ information environment include an equity-based information asymmetry 
measure, firm size, number of prior deals for a firm, whether or not the firm has R&D expenses, whether or 
not the firm has credit rating and whether or not the firm has analyst following.  
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for borrowers without a high reputation bank located in their geographic area, higher 
quality accounting information increases the probability that a borrower transacts with a 
geographically remote reputable lead bank. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related 
literature about the role of accounting information in debt contracting, and how distance 
between lenders and borrowers affects loan transactions. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present 
empirical design and results. Chapter 5 concludes.  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section 2.1 relates this paper to the literature on the role of accounting 
information in lending decisions. Section 2.2 briefly discusses the literature about the 
effect of geographic distance on lending behavior. Section 2.3 describes how the trade-off 
between accounting information and soft information could affect the probability of 
getting loans from high-reputation banks.  
2.1 Accounting Information and Lending Decisions 
The firm’s financial reporting system is crucial in providing useful information 
for decision making in debt contracting (see Armstrong et al. (2010) for a review). Debt 
holders, such as banks, always demand reliable information to facilitate their’ assessment 
of downside risk and future cash flows from investment projects to evaluate credit quality 
of the firm. Financial accounting information plays a particularly significant role when 
high quality information generated from the financial reporting system provides banks 
with adequate information about asset values and/or performance measurement for 
monitoring. If the firm’s financial accounting information is opaque regarding asset 
values and/or performance measurement, it will be costly for banks to assess the firm’s 
credit quality and thereby less likely for the firm to get loans from these banks.  
Many contributions in the accounting literature have documented the importance 
of accounting information in influencing key aspects of debt contract design including 
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cost of debt (Bharath et al., 2008; Beatty et al., 2002; Zhang, 2008; Cassar et al., 2011), 
debt covenants (Beatty et al., 2008; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2011; Nikolaev, 2010; 
Graham et al., 2008; Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011), maturity and security 
requirements (Bharath et al., 2008), and investment and dividend payout restrictions 
(Beatty et al., 2010; Chava et al., 2010). Armstrong et al. (2010) emphasize that there is 
relatively little research on the role of accounting information in determining whether a 
firm can obtain debt financing and posit that the lack of research in this area is partly 
attributable to the difficulty of identifying firms that intent to borrow but fail to engage 
with a willing lender. As an exception, a recent paper Cassar et al. (2011) investigate the 
role of accounting information in small business lending by examining whether more 
sophisticated accounting methods (in the form of accrual accounting) interacts with other 
information sources to reduce information asymmetries between small business 
borrowers and lenders, thereby lowering borrowers’ probability of loan denial. Using 
data from the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) database, they find little 
evidence that the use of accrual accounting determines the likelihood of loan denial. 
Furthermore, using firms’ ongoing lending relationship with banks as a proxy for banks’ 
soft information acquisition, they find that there is no trade-off between accounting 
information and soft information in determining the probability of loan denial in small 
business lending. Their study uses a sample of small, privately-held companies in the U.S. 
with fewer than 500 employees, and these small businesses have no tax or external 
reporting requirements. As a result, it is management’s voluntary choice to use accrual 
accounting in these firms. My study differs from Cassar et al. (2011) by focusing on large, 
publicly-held U.S. companies with external financial reporting requirements. The 
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measures of financial accounting quality are estimated using publicly disclosed financial 
data.  
My study adds to the literature by investigating the extent to which lending 
decisions of lead banks incorporate trade-offs between access to a borrower’s soft, 
internal information and the quality of the borrower’s financial accounting information. I 
hypothesize that distance between the borrower and the lender increases with accounting 
information quality, implying that higher quality accounting information creates scope 
for firms to forge lending relationships with geographically remote lenders that would be 
unavailable in the absence of such hard information.7
To investigate the role of accounting information in debt contracting, prior 
research has focused on a number of distinct attributes of accounting quality. As 
discussed in prior literature, it is unclear exactly which accounting properties are 
important in debt contracting and different research seems to focus on different attributes 
of accounting system in isolation (Armstrong et al., 2010; Beatty, 2008).  The elements of 
accounting system that have been examined include various measures of accruals quality 
(Bharath et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2009; Balakrishnan, 2010), the timeliness of 
accounting information (Beatty et al., 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008), and the debt 
contracting value of accounting (Ball et al., 2008; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2011). 
However, resolving the issue of the best measure of accounting quality is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Thus, I use a number of key measures estimated at both the industry 
and firm-specific level that have been previously used in the debt literature. The primary 
 
                                                     
7 As discussed in Section 2.2, one potential cost of engaging with a geographically closer bank is higher 
interest rates because the bank has privileged access to soft information to the extent that such information 
cannot be credibly communicated to outsiders. This creates potential incentive for the borrower to transact 
with geographically remote banks to reduce the cost of credit.  
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measure is an indicator equal to one if the debt contracting value of accounting (DCV) is 
greater or equal to sample median and zero otherwise.  Following Ball et al. (2008), DCV 
is conceptualized as the ability of publicly reported accounting data to predict 
deteriorations in the credit quality of a borrower on a timely basis, as the primary proxy 
for accounting information quality. DCV is estimated at the industry level as the R-square 
from the regression of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI), originated by 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. 
Consistent with Ball et al. (2008) and Christensen and Nikolaev (2011), the industry-level 
measure of DCV is characterized as a firm’s accounting information that “is beyond the 
choice of managers and derives from differences in the inherent ability of the economy-
wide accounting regime to capture changes in economic fundamentals on a timely basis 
across industries” (Ball et al., 2008). As a robustness check, an alternative DCV measure 
is estimated. Other properties of accounting information commonly used in the literature, 
such as industry-level timeliness and firm-specific accrual quality, are also used. Details 
of estimations are included in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Soft Information, Geographic Distance and Bank Lending 
Economic theory posits that banks are special in terms of their ability to collect 
and process information to monitor borrowers, especially soft, qualitative information 
that is difficult to reduce to hard numbers or to easily communicate to those outside the 
firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Fama, 1985; Diamond, 1984, 1991; Petersen, 2004). For 
instance, soft information acquisition is shown to be more significant for small business 
lending (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995). 
Such soft information about small businesses can be collected by lending officers over 
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time through personal relationships with these firms. Theories based on incomplete 
contracting suggest that small and/or decentralized organizations have a comparative 
advantage in activities that make extensive use of soft information. This can potentially 
explain the consequences of consolidation in the banking industry where bank mergers 
lead to declines in small business lending (Stein, 2002). In addition, Berger et al. (2005) 
show that smaller banks, presumably having more local focus, have an advantage over 
larger banks in collecting and acting on soft information. Thus, the distance between a 
bank and its borrower increases with the size of the bank. 
Geographic distance has been established by a number of studies as a key aspect 
in bank lending. Two broad channels have been identified in economics literature for the 
effects of distance on credit market transactions. Firstly, studies on spatial rationing have 
established a correspondence between distance and credit rationing. Geographic distance 
gives banks privileged access to soft information to facilitate the evaluation of the firms’ 
creditworthiness, thereby permitting them to gain a cost advantage for monitoring over 
more remote competitors who may not enjoy the same degree of access to such 
information (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). Hauswald and Marquez (2006) develop a 
model in which the quality of a bank’s proprietary information is a decreasing function of 
the distance between bank and borrower. In other words, the precision of the signal about 
a borrower’s quality received by a bank decreases with distance. Because banks receive 
more precise signals about closer borrowers, competing banks face increasing adverse 
selection problems when approaching borrowers closer to the most informed bank. Local 
banks then strategically use their information advantage to create adverse-selection 
threats for competitors, thereby softening lending competition and extending their market 
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share. As lenders’ information advantage vanishes with distance, competition increases 
and investments in information acquisition fall, resulting in lower interest rates but also 
less efficient lending decisions.  
The information effect of distance has been shown empirically to facilitate ex ante 
screening and ex post monitoring of borrowers in bank lending, providing well-informed 
banks with competitiveness and market power (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Guiso et al., 
2004). One benefit to borrowers closer to their banks is that, with privileged access to 
information, inefficient rationing might be reduced. Sufi (2007) finds that loan 
participation by domestic lenders is higher when borrowers are more opaque or 
observationally risky. Similarly, Qian and Strahan (2007) find that the same is true if 
lenders are located in countries with weak creditor rights and the absence of a sovereign 
rating contribute to lending risk and opacity. Using a unique data set of all loan 
applications by small firms to a large bank, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) document that 
the closer a firm is to its branch office, the more likely the bank is to offer credit. 
However, borrowing from closer banks is associated with, for example, higher interest 
rates (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). The reason is that borrowers are informationally 
captured by lenders who have privileged access to soft information to the extent that such 
information cannot be credibly communicated to outsiders (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 
2004). Dass and Massa (forthcoming) also document that borrowing from closer banks 
lowers the firms’ stock liquidity, since the information asymmetry between the well-
informed banks and other market participants increases adverse selection. 
Secondly, shorter lender-borrower distance potentially benefits both parties since 
it reduces transaction costs. Examples of such costs include transportation costs incurred 
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in the process of loan application, and the time and effort spent by a potential borrower to 
personally interact with loan officers or to look for a suitable loan. In classical models of 
location differentiation (e.g., Salop, 1979), borrowers incur distance-related 
transportation costs from visiting their banks and banks price loans uniformly if they 
cannot observe borrowers’ locations or are prevented from charging different prices to 
different borrowers (see Freixas and Rochet (2008) for a review). However, if banks 
observe the borrowers’ locations and offer interest rates based on that information, they 
may engage in spatial price discrimination (Lederer and Hurter, 1986). For example, 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) document that loan rates decrease with the distance between 
the firm and the lending bank and increase with the distance between the firm and 
competing banks, suggesting that transportation costs cause the spatial price 
discrimination. 
2.3 Distance and Borrowing from Reputable Bank  
To expand the conclusions of the previous analysis, I also examine the extent to 
which accounting quality increases the prospects for geographically isolated firms to 
have their syndicated loans arranged by a high reputation bank. Economic theory 
demonstrates that a firm’s reputation serves as a mechanism to ensure the market of its 
credibility to produce high quality goods (Klein and Leffler, 1981; DeAngelo, 1981; 
Shapiro, 1983; Booth and Smith, 1986). As a result, reputable financial intermediaries - 
an important information producer in capital markets - are expected to have greater 
incentives in credible information transmission. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a, 1994b) 
model the role of reputation in facilitating financial intermediaries’ information 
production by examining ex ante screening of borrowers and ex post monitoring by banks 
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respectively. In the ex ante screening case, banks’ costs incurred to evaluate firms’ future 
prospects increase with the rigor of evaluation, where more rigorous evaluation makes it 
more likely that borrowers with poor prospects will be discovered and denied a loan. This 
benefits borrowers who pass a more rigorous evaluation by increased future performance 
on average than those granted loans based on a less rigorous evaluation. Since banks’ 
choice of evaluation rigor is unobservable to outsiders, investors assess banks’ reputation 
for supplying rigorous evaluations based on the observable outcomes of past transactions 
sponsored by these banks. Therefore, banks with higher reputations adopt more rigorous 
evaluation standards than lower reputation banks. The fact that a reputable bank agrees to 
grant loans to a firm reveals favorable information about the firm. In the ex post 
monitoring case, the ability to acquire a favorable reputation provides banks with 
endogenous incentives to put more effort in ex post monitoring of firms who 
subsequently become financially distressed. 
Consistent with the above theory, a recent paper Ross (2010) documents 
empirically that firms borrowing from reputable banks experience favorable stock price 
responses to loan announcements, and this is especially the case for informationally 
opaque firms. In summary, firms have incentives to engage with banks that have higher 
reputation since stricter ex ante screening and ex post monitoring by reputable banks 
mitigate the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Ross (2010) and 
Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) also show that distance matters for the 
likelihood of getting a loan from reputable banks, suggesting that soft information is still 
a key aspect. 
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This study adds to the literature by exploiting the effect of the trade-off between 
hard and soft information on the probability of getting loans from highly reputable banks. 
In particular, I hypothesize that for borrowers without a high reputation bank located in 
their geographic area, higher quality accounting information increases the probability that 
a borrower transacts with a geographically remote reputable lead bank.  
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSES OF DISTANCE AND ACCOUNTING QUALITY 
 
Section 3.1 discusses the distance measure and Section 3.2 illustrates various 
measures of the quality of accounting information. The empirical design is shown in 
Section 3.3, and data and results are included in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 incorporates 
additional analyses and robustness tests. 
3.1 Distance Measurement 
There are various ways to measure the lender-borrower distance in the literature. 
In studies on small business finance where loan officers of bank branches collect 
information about borrowers via frequent interactions such as office visit and interview, 
distance is from the main office of the firm to the office or branch of the lender which the 
firm uses most frequently (Petersen and Rajan,  2002; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). In 
studies on syndicated loans, distance-related measure in Ross (2010) is estimated from 
borrowers’ headquarters to the headquarters of lead banks of syndicated loans, the 
justification of which is that banks’ headquarters are the “primary places of work for only 
a majority of the corporate bankers who maintain relationships with large, public 
borrowers in the syndicated loan market” (Ross, 2010).8
                                                     
8 Similar estimation can be found in Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011). 
 Finally, Dass and Massa 
(forthcoming) measure distance from the borrower’s main office to the nearest “large” 
branch of the ultimate controller/owner of any lending bank within the borrower’s loan 
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syndication, where “large” branch is defined as the one with deposit size than the year’s 
median deposit size in branches across  the country. Consistent with Ross (2010) and 
Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), I measure the lender-borrower distance as 
the distance between headquarters of the borrower to the headquarters of the lead bank. 
Distance is not measured using the location of any branch of the lead bank or the 
headquarters/branch of the ultimate controller/owner of the lead bank because the lead 
bank’s headquarters are usually responsible for due diligence, negotiation of terms and 
monitoring in loan syndication.9
The distance measure in this study, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the physical distance between the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of 
the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that “distance 
to a firm’s lender is a skewed distribution. Moreover, from an economic perspective, 
there is a large difference between a firm being 5 miles from its lender rather than 100 
miles from its lender, while there is probably little difference between it being 1,005 
miles instead of 1,100 miles from its lender.” Thus, using the log of one plus the distance 
between a firm and its lending institution is a favored measure of distance to address the 
concern of skewness and the potential nonlinearity of the economic effects of distance. 
Distance is measured as follows: (1) zip codes of borrowers’ and lead arrangers’ 
headquarters are collected from Dealscan, Compustat, company websites, FDIC (Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation) Institution Directory
 
10
                                                     
9 Following Ross (2010) and Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), I posit that while lead banks have 
satellite offices in many regions of the country, these offices rarely engage in the syndicated loan activities 
of large, public borrowers that are the focus of this study. In addition, per talking with an ex-managing 
director in Citigroup, this assumption was confirmed as reasonable in practice. 
, and Bloomberg Businessweek 
   
10 The website for FDIC Institution Directory is: http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/index.asp. 
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small business search.11 For foreign lead arrangers (such as Credit Suisse and Deutsche 
Bank), domestic headquarters (or representative offices) in the U.S. are recognized as the 
location for distance measurement; (2) the corresponding coordinates (latitudes and 
longitudes) for each zip code are obtained from GPS Visualizer website;12
3.2 Accounting Quality Measures 
 (3) distances 
are calculated (in miles) using coordinates of locations by the STATA code “globdist”; (4) 
LDISTANCE is finally defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the distance 
calculated above. 
The primary accounting measure is an indicator (HIGH_FFDCV) equal to one if 
the debt-contracting value of accounting information (DCV) is greater or equal to sample 
median and zero otherwise. Similar to Ball et al. (2008)13 in which DCV is 
conceptualized as the ability of publicly reported accounting data to predict deteriorations 
in the credit quality of a borrower on a timely basis, the debt contracting value of 
accounting information (FFDCV) is measured at the Fama-French 48 industry level as 
the R-square from the regression of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on 
lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings.14
                                                     
11 The website for Bloomberg Businessweek small business search is: 
 FFDCV is estimated based on 
Equation (1) as follows: 
http://www.businessweek.com/small-
business/. 
  
12 The website for GPS Visualizer is: http://www.gpsvisualizer.com/geocode. The webpage returns 
coordinates provided by the Yahoo! and Google Geocoding APIs. 
 
13 The measure in Ball et al. (2008) is a goodness-of-fit statistic from a probit model where credit ratings 
downgrades (from Moody’s) are modeled as a function of lagged, seasonally adjusted changes in 
accounting earnings. Because of the data constraint for the change of credit rating, I use the change of DLI 
as the dependent variable. 
   
14 In regression analyses, this R-square measure of FFDCV is multiplied by 100. The same application is 
used for regressions with TIMELINESS and TADCV. The interpretation and significance of coefficients 
are unaffected by such scaling of independent variables.  
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∆𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−3 + 𝛽4∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−4 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡  (1) 
∆𝐸 is the seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings before extraordinary items 
scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period. ∆𝐷𝐿𝐼 is the quarterly changes of 
default likelihood indicator (DLI). Vassalou and Xing (2004) calculate the default 
likelihood for individual firms using the option pricing model in Merton (1974), in which 
the equity of a firm is viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets since equity holders are 
residual claimants on the firm’s assets after all other obligations have been met. The 
strike price of the call option is the book value of the firm’s liabilities. When the value of 
the firm’s assets is less than the strike price, the value of equity is zero. Based on the 
analyses in Vassalou and Xing (2004), theoretical probability of default likelihood (𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓) 
is defined as: 
𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓 = 𝑁�− ln�𝑉𝐴,𝑡 𝑋𝑡⁄ � + �𝜇 − 12𝜎𝐴2� 𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
� 
𝑉𝐴 is the firm’s asset value with an instantaneous drift 𝜇 and an instantaneous volatility 
𝜎𝐴. 𝑋𝑡 is the book value of debt, which plays the role of the strike price of the call option 
since the market value of equity can be thought of as a call option on 𝑉𝐴 with time to 
expiration equal to 𝑇. Default likelihood indicator is measured monthly at firm level. 
Since it is unclear exactly which accounting properties are important in debt 
contracting, alternative proxies for the quality of accounting information, measured at the 
industry-level or firm-level, are adopted for robustness check. Firstly, Ecker et al. (2011) 
document that peer firms selected based on lagged total assets perform as well as (or 
better than) those selected by industry at detecting earnings management. This result 
provides an option for measuring DCV using peer firm classifications based on lagged 
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total assets in addition to Fama-French industry classifications. An alternative DCV 
measure, TADCV, is measured at the 45 category level grouped by lagged total assets as 
the R-square from the regression of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on 
lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. 
Secondly, besides the alternative DCV measure, I also include two measures of 
accounting properties that are widely explored in the financial accounting literature. The 
first measure is TIMELINESS which captures the extent to which current earnings 
capture the information set underlying contemporaneous changes in stock price. I create 
an indicator, HIGH_TIMELINESS, equal to one if TIMELINESS is greater or equal to 
sample median and zero otherwise. TIMELINESS is an equity market based measure 
estimated at the Fama-French 48 industry level as the R-square from the following 
regression:15
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2)  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the four-month adjusted stock return ending one month after the fiscal quarter t, 𝐸𝑖𝑡 
is the quarterly earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets at the beginning 
of the period and ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 is seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings before 
extraordinary items scaled by total assets at the beginning of the period. 
The second measure is accrual quality (AQ) that captures the information risk 
associated with earnings, an important dimension of a firm’s information quality. 
Following Francis et al. (2005), AQ was measured as the firm-level standard deviation of 
the residuals (from year t-4 to year t) from the yearly estimation of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model modified by McNicols (2002) for each Fama-French 48 industry: 
                                                     
15 Similar designs are implemented in Bushman et al. (2004), Ball et al. (2008) and others. 
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𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 = total current accruals for firm i in 
year t, where ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the change in current assets, ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the change in current 
liabilities, ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the change in cash, and ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 is the change in debt in current 
liabilities. 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = cash flow from operations, where 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 is net 
income before extraordinary items and 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 +
∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 = total accruals, where 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 is depreciation and amortization 
expense. ∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the change in revenue and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the gross value of property, plant 
& equipment. I use NAQ, equal to -1 times AQ, in the regression so that higher NAQ 
indicates higher quality of accounting information.  
3.3 Empirical Design 
To examine the trade-off between accounting information and distance, the 
following pooled OLS regression is estimated by including fixed effects of year, deal 
purpose and SIC 4-digit industry classifications with standard errors clustered at the 
industry level:16
𝐿𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (4)  
As discussed above, the dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of 
one plus the physical distance between the headquarters of borrowers and the 
headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. The coefficient 𝛽1 captures the 
relation between accounting information and geographic distance in syndicated loans. I 
hypothesize that 𝛽1 is positive, implying the distance between the borrower and the lead 
                                                     
16 Regressions with HIGH_FFDCV and HIGH_TIMELINESS as proxies for the quality of accounting 
information are clustered at the Fama-French 48 industry level. Regression with TADCV as the proxy is 
clustered at the 45 category level grouped by lagged total assets.   
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bank is increasing in various measures of accounting quality. Various deal-specific and 
firm-specific controls are included in the regression. For deal-specific controls, 
PRIOR_LEADER is an indicator equal to 1 if the current lead arranger is a lead arranger 
for the borrower in a previous deal. REPUTATION is an indicator equal to 1 if the 
ultimate controller of the lead arranger is one of the reputable banks in the syndicated 
loan market. REVOLVER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is revolving. 
COLLATERAL is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is secured with collateral. 
DEALSIZE is natural logarithm of the total value of each deal. MATURITY is the 
number of months to loan maturity. PRIORDEAL is the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of syndicated loans taken by the borrower in Dealscan database. 
LOAN_SPREAD is natural logarithm of the total annual all-in-spread drawn paid for 
each dollar drawn down under the loan commitment (including fees and interest). 
COVENANT is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of financial covenants 
of the loan. SIZE is natural logarithm of the book value of total asset. LEVERAGE is the 
ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. 
ROA is the returns on assets equal to the ratio of quarterly earnings before extraordinary 
items to total assets. INTEREST_COV is the interest coverage equal to interest expense 
plus quarterly earnings before extraordinary items scaled by interest expense. Detail 
definitions of variables are included in Appendix A.  
This study further investigates the impact of information opacity on the trade-off 
between accounting information and distance in lending decisions. Proxies of information 
asymmetry that potentially trigger the differences in the trade-off between accounting 
information and soft information in bank lending include an equity-based information 
 24 
 
asymmetry measure, firm size, number of prior deals, whether or not the firm has R&D 
expenses, whether or not the firm has credit ratings and whether or not the firm has 
analyst following. Firstly, I use a capital market based measure developed by Llorente et 
al. (2002) as a proxy for information asymmetry.17
𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛿0𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
 Using a simply model that investors 
trade to share risks or speculate on private information, Llorente et al. (2002) show that 
returns generated by risk-sharing trades tend to reverse themselves, while returns 
generated by speculative trades tend to continue themselves. This theoretical prediction 
can be estimated by analyzing the relation between daily volume and first-order return 
autocorrelation for individual stocks as follows: 
𝑅𝑖 is the daily return for stock i. 𝑉𝑡 is the trading volume and measured as  𝑉𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 −
1
200
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡+𝑠
−1
𝑠=−200  and 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 +0.0000225), where 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 is the daily turnover. The coefficient 𝛿2𝑖 captures the 
effect of information asymmetry on volume-return relation and is the measure of 
information asymmetry (INFO_ASY) in this study. Significantly positive 𝛿2𝑖 should be 
expected for stocks associated with very significant speculative trade, while for stocks 
with predominantly hedge trade, 𝛿2𝑖 should be significantly negative. INFO_ASY is 
measured by estimating the above regression in time series at firm level. 
Secondly, numbers of contributions in the literature of small business finance 
indicate that soft information acquisition is crucial particularly for smaller firms that are 
more opaque and hard to credibly communicate with outsiders (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 
                                                     
17 Dass and Massa (forthcoming) provide evidence on the association between the lender-borrower distance 
and this information asymmetry measure. They document that information asymmetry increases with the 
distance between the borrower and the lender.   
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2002; Berger and Udell, 1995). For this reason, smaller firms are expected to have more 
significant trade-offs between accounting information and soft information. Thirdly, the 
market knows better about firms that engage more in syndicated loans in the past than 
those first-time borrowers. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that firms with fewer prior 
deals in the syndicated loan market are more opaque, thereby the trade-off between 
accounting information and soft information is more significant. Fourthly, R&D expense 
is used in prior literature as a proxy for intangible assets, which are associated with 
higher information asymmetry (see Barth and Kaszink (1999) and Barth et al. (2001)). As 
a result, the trade-off between accounting information and distance is expected to be 
amplified for borrowers with more R&D expenses. Fifthly, as documented in prior 
literature, credit rating agencies that provide independent information reduces 
information asymmetries and can substitute for accounting information in the design of 
syndicate structure (see Ball et al. (2008)). Thus, I expect that the trade-off between 
accounting information and distance is stronger for firms without credit ratings. Finally, it 
has been documented in the literature that greater analyst following reduces information 
asymmetry (see Healy and Palepu (2001) for a review). Thus, the trade-off between 
accounting information and soft information is more significant for firms without analyst 
following. 
To test these predictions, observations in the sample are divided into two groups 
based on each information asymmetry proxy and regression (4) is estimated respectively 
for the two groups. For instance, observations are classified into “higher (lower) 
INFO_ASY” group if INFO_ASY is positive (negative). In addition, observations are 
classified into “smaller (larger) SIZE” group if SIZE is smaller (larger) than sample 
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median and into the “smaller (larger) PRIORDEAL” group if PRIORDEAL is smaller 
(larger) than sample median. For R&D expenses as a proxy, firms are classified into 
“with R&D” group if they have R&D expenses, and into “without R&D” group if they do 
not have R&D expenses. For credit ratings as a proxy, firms are classified into “without 
Rating” group if they do not have S&P credit ratings, and into “with Rating” group if 
they have S&P credit ratings. For analyst following as a proxy, firms are classified into 
“without Analyst” group if they do not have analyst following, and into “with Analyst” 
group if they have analyst following. Overall, I hypothesize that the trade-off between 
accounting information and distance is significantly larger for more opaque borrowers. 
3.4 Data Sources and Results 
Dealscan, provided by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), contains data on 
syndicated loan agreements at the time of their origination. The syndicated loan data are 
gathered from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (13Ds, 14Ds, 13Es, 10-Ks, 
and 8-Ks) or through LPC’s relationships with major banks active in the syndicated loan 
market. The loans (or facilities) are grouped in deals (or packages of loans) when 
borrowing firms enter into multiple agreements at the same time. The analyses in this 
study are performed at the deal level because syndicated loan contracts are drafted at the 
deal level and all lenders participate in deal tranches collectively, not independently (Sufi, 
2007). In addition, the financial accounting data of the largest loan (or facility) in the deal 
are used for the deal-specific analyses. Financial accounting data are collected from 
Compustat. Stock return data and analyst forecast data are obtained from CRSP and 
I/B/E/S respectively. 
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The sample selection procedures are summarized in Table 1. I first use the 
matching file originated by Chava and Roberts (2008) to match Dealscan borrowers to 
Compustat. Then financial firms are excluded and data on loan-specific variables and 
distance are required. Finally, accounting data are merged on according to the largest 
loan in each deal. The final sample contains 14,063 deals from 3,973 firms for the period 
of 1987-2006. After requiring all available deal-specific and firm-specific variables, the 
deal samples for major regression analyses using distance measures and HIGH_FFDCV 
range from 9,339 to 11,219. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all the variables. Panel A shows the 
distribution of the geographic distance. After being truncated at the 1% and the 99% 
level18
Descriptions of other variables are included in Table 2 Panel B. Large deviations 
between means and medians for FFDCV indicate large variation of accounting measures 
across industries. In addition, about 97% of the deals are generated by lead lenders who 
are lead arrangers for the borrower in previous deals, 54% of them are generated by 
reputable banks. The median deal size is about $220 million and the median firm size 
, the sample median of the distance between a borrower and the lender is 617.08 
miles while the mean is 802.98 miles, implying large variation of borrower-lender 
distance in the sample. This is also confirmed by the distribution of distance by quintiles, 
with the median distance ranges from 39.09 miles in the 1st quintile to 1,973.92 miles in 
the 5th quintile. Figure 1 further presents the distribution of deal observations by distance 
category. 3,508 deals are arranged by lenders that are less than 250 miles away from the 
borrowers, while 2,086 deals are arranged by banks that are greater than 1,500 miles 
away from the borrowing firms. 
                                                     
18 All continuous variables in the regressions are truncated at 1% and 99% level. 
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(total assets) of the largest loan of the deal is about $1,226 million. Moreover, these loans 
have a median maturity of 45 months, a median spread of 135 basis points above a 
benchmark risk-free rate, and one financial covenant on average. 
Table 3 Panel A shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the key 
variables and deal-specific variables and Panel B shows the correlations between the key 
variables and firm-specific variables. Univariate evidence in Panel A shows that there is a 
positive correlation between HIGH_FFDCV and LDISTANCE, consistent with the 
prediction that distance increases with the quality of accounting information. In addition, 
the borrower-lender distance is relatively longer if the firm engages with a reputable lead 
bank and if the lead bank was a lead bank for the firm’s prior deals. Moreover, firms with 
larger deals and larger number of prior deals (i.e., non-first-time borrowers) are relatively 
more distant from their lead banks. Finally, the borrower-lender distance is relatively 
smaller for revolvers, and is larger for deals with collaterals, longer maturity and higher 
interest spreads. Results in Panel B indicate that the borrower-lender distance increases 
with firm size. Moreover, firms with analyst following have relatively longer distance 
from their lead arrangers. 
Table 4 shows the results of the relation between accounting information and 
geographic distance. In Table 4 Panel A, consistent with the prediction, HIGH_FFDCV is 
positively correlated with distance after controlling for various deal-specific and firm-
specific characteristics and considering potential year, industry (SIC 4-digit industry 
classification) and deal purpose fixed effects, which indicates that higher quality 
accounting information increases the geographic distance between borrowers and lead 
arrangers of syndicated loans. This implies that high-quality accounting information 
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improves a borrower’s information environment by increasing transparency, thereby 
enabling the borrower to engage with a geographically remote bank, who usually grants 
loans to spatially closer borrowers that are more efficiently monitored based on soft 
information. This result is consistent with the prediction that the availability of high 
quality accounting information attenuates the demand for soft information in banks’ 
decision to lend. Furthermore, consistent result is provided in Table 4 Panel A by using 
TADCV as an alternative measure of debt contracting value of accounting information. 
In Table 4 Panel B, the result for the industry-level measure of timeliness 
(HIGH_TIMELINESS) is also consistent with the above.  In addition, the result for the 
firm-specific accrual quality measure is similar, although the number of observations for 
the estimation drops significantly. 
Finally, results for the controls are consistent with prior literature. For example, 
REPUTATION is shown to be significantly positive with LDISTANCE, implying that 
the distance between higher reputation banks and their borrowers are longer than that 
between non-reputable banks and their borrowers. Since reputable banks are usually large 
banks that dominate the syndicated loan market (Ross, 2010), this result, to some extent, 
is consistent with Berger et al. (2005) documenting that the distance between a bank and 
its borrower increases with the size of the bank. In addition, the significantly positive 
correlation between PRIOR_LEADER and LDISTANCE is also expected. Lead 
arrangers with prior loan deals for the current borrower have more information about the 
borrower, thereby reducing their costs to acquire soft information in current deals.  
Table 5 documents the variation of the trade-off between accounting information 
(using HIGH_FFDCV as a proxy) and soft information with information asymmetry. In 
 30 
 
general, Table 5 Panel A and Panel B show that the trade-off between HIGH_FFDCV 
and LDISTANCE is more significant for borrowers that have higher information 
asymmetry (INFO_ASY), are smaller in size, have fewer numbers of prior deals, have 
R&D expenses, have no credit ratings and have no analyst following.19 For instance, the 
coefficient on HIGH_FFDCV is significantly positive for firms with higher information 
asymmetry (INFO_ASY) while the correlation between HIGH_FFDCV and 
LDISTANCE is insignificant. For firm size (SIZE) as a proxy, smaller firms have 
significantly positive correlation between HIGH_FFDCV and LDISTANCE while the 
coefficient on HIGH_FFDCV is significantly negative for larger firms.20
3.5 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
 Using firms’ 
number of prior deals as a proxy, it is shown that the correlation between HIGH_FFDCV 
and LDISTANCE is significantly positive for both groups, but the coefficient is larger 
and more significant for firms with smaller numbers of prior deals. Similar results can be 
observed for regressions using R&D, RATING and ANALST as proxies. 
This section shows additional analyses for the correlation between 
HIGH_FFDCV and LDISTANCE and some tests with additional controls for robustness. 
The first analysis considers the effect of industry clustering (by state or city) of the firms 
and the lead banks on the trade-off between accounting information and soft information. 
                                                     
19 Untabulated results for the alternative industry-level accounting quality measure, HIGH_TIMELINESS, 
are similar as those for HIGH_FFDCV. 
  
20 The negative correlation between HIGH_FFDCV and LDISTANCE for larger firms does not indicate 
contradiction to the prediction. Compared with smaller firms, larger firms have more transparent 
information environment. Lead banks of larger firms can obtain information from sources other than 
financial accounting information. As a result, the prediction of the correlation between accounting 
information and soft information is not clear for these firms. Overall, the evidence implies that the average 
trade-off between accounting information and soft information in bank’s lending decisions is driven 
primarily by smaller firms. 
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The main accounting information measure, HIGH_FFDCV, is based on FFDCV which is 
estimated at the Fama-French 48 industry level. Controlling for the fixed effect of state 
where the borrower is located addresses the concern that firms in the same industry may 
clustered in the same state.21,22 Moreover, it has been documented that banks move their 
headquarters from small cities to large cities via mergers and acquisitions, consistent with 
the existence of agglomeration economies available to the banking industry.23
                                                     
21 For instance, the Silicon Valley in California is the location where a large number of high-tech firms are 
located. 
 The 
rationale is that as more banks cluster together, costs of service may decline significantly. 
Even when banks cluster with their direct competitors, there may be advantages because 
that cluster could attract more customers than a single bank could alone. To control for 
the potential effect of clustering in banking industry on the relation between 
HIGH_FFDCV and LDISTANCE, I include zip code fixed effects for banks in regression 
(4). Results in Table 6 Panel A show that the correlation between HIGH_FFDCV and 
LDISTANCE is still significantly positive after controlling for firms’ state fixed effects 
and banks’ zip code fixed effects respectively. The results remain unchanged when 
including both state and zip code fixed effects in the regression. Therefore, the main 
result in this paper is not driven by either the firms’ or the banks’ industry clustering 
effects. 
 
22 The control of state fixed effects also addresses the concern that the distance may be driven by the 
distribution of businesses and banks in different states. For example, it is about the same distance from 
Omaha to Kansas City as that between Baltimore and New York City. However, the business and bank 
concentration is greater in Baltimore and New York City than that in Omaha to Kansas City. Thus, a 
borrower-lender distance from Omaha to Kansas City should be perceived to be “closer” than that from 
Baltimore and New York City. 
  
23 DeYong et al. (2004) shows that, during the 1990s, mergers and acquisitions have allowed large 
publicly-traded banks to move their company headquarters from smaller cities to larger cities, consistent 
with the existence of agglomeration economies available to banking companies.  
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The second analysis addresses the concern that results could be driven by banks 
located in New York. As shown in Appendix B, about 40% of the deals in the sample are 
arranged by lead banks located in New York. I re-estimate regression (4) using banks 
located in New York and banks not located in New York respectively. Results in Table 6 
Panel B indicate that, for banks in New York, the correlation between HIGH_FFDCV 
and LDISTANCE is still significantly positive, consistent with the main findings in 
Section 3.4. Furthermore, the result remains unchanged for banks not located in New 
York.      
A recent study Engelberg et al. (forthcoming) documents the influence of personal 
connections between employees at firms and banks on lending and borrowing practices. 
They define such personal connections as social connections formed when two people are 
simultaneously active members in organizations (such as charities, school boards, etc.), 
past professional connections formed when two people shared a place of employment, 
and school connections formed when two people graduate from same educational 
institution within two years of one another. The concern is whether personal connections 
is imbedded in the distance measure or not, especially in the case when firms are more 
distant from their banks. As discussed in prior sections, geographic distance captures the 
ability of banks to obtain soft information about borrowers. The more distant the 
borrower is from the bank, the more difficult it is for the bank to obtain soft information. 
If the borrower has personal connections with the bank, this could allow both parties to 
transcend the limit of geographic distance. In this case, soft information acquisition does 
not decrease with the borrower-lender distance. As a result, I may not be able to 
document the trade-off between soft information and accounting information, if the 
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firm’s personal connections with the bank allow them to transact with the geographically 
remote bank. Since the personal connection story works against finding results in this 
study, controlling for personal connections should lead to stronger results, i.e., the trade-
off between accounting and soft information should be more significant.  
Finally, several robustness tests are performed by including additional (or 
alternative) controls in regression (4). First, to control for the potential changes in 
borrower-lender distance with the development of information technology in the past few 
decades that facilitate the communication between borrowing firms and lead banks, I 
include in regression (4) a time trend variable equal to the difference between the year of 
the deal and the starting year of the sample period (i.e., 1987). Second, I control for the 
potential impact of debt contract characteristics in prior deals on the trade-off between 
accounting information and soft information. In regression (4), I replace the indicator 
variable, PRIOR_LEADER, with prior deal contract characteristics such as whether or 
not the loan is revolving, whether or not the loan is secured with collateral, loan size, 
maturity, interest spreads and the number of covenant. Third, as discussed in the Section 
2.3, borrowing firms benefit from engaging with high reputation banks. Therefore, they 
have incentives to transact with these banks. This paper then control for the existence of 
reputable banks or credible comparable banks in the area in regression (4). Overall, the 
results are robust in all these tests.
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSES OF LOAN SYNDICATION BY REPUTABLE BANKS 
 
4.1 Empirical Design 
The following probit regression includes the interaction between the trade-off of 
accounting information and soft information to examine the effect of such trade-off on 
the probability of getting loans arranged by reputable banks are estimated with year, deal 
purpose and Fama-French 48 industry fixed effects: 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑉𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑁𝑂𝑇_𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃_𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐶𝑉𝑖 ∗
𝑁𝑂𝑇_𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝑅𝐸𝑃_𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡    (5) 
The dependent variable, REPUTATION, is an indicator equal to 1 if the ultimate 
controller of the lead arranger is one of the reputable banks in the syndicated loan market. 
HIGH_ FFDCV is an indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median, 
where FFDCV is the industry-level debt contracting value of accounting information 
measured at the Fama-French 48 industry level as the R-square from regressions of the 
changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in 
quarterly earnings. The coefficient 𝛾3 captures the trade-off between accounting 
information and soft information, and is expected to be positive.24
                                                     
24 Ai and Norton (2003) emphasize that the “magnitude of the interaction effect in nonlinear models does 
not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term, can be of opposite sign, and its statistical significance 
is not calculated by standard software”. The statistical significance for interaction terms in the probit model 
is calculated following Ai and Norton (2003)’s approach.   
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NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK is an indicator equal to 1 if the headquarters of the borrower 
is not located within a certain distance of the headquarters of the lead arranger. The 
threshold is determined as follows: (i) for each of the reputable lead arrangers identified, 
calculate the distances (in miles) between all the borrowers and the lead arranger using 
coordinates of the locations; (ii) after ranking the distances in deciles (with shorter 
distances in the 1st decile), identify the maximum distance in each decile; (iii) take the 
mean of the maximum distance in each decile across all the reputable lead arrangers; (iv) 
the mean of the maximum distance in the 1st decile is the threshold for the identification 
of closeness to reputable lead arrangers. 
The following deal-specific controls are also included in the regression. 
PRIOR_LEADER is an indicator equal to 1 if the current lead arranger is a lead arranger 
for the borrower in a previous deal. NEAR_COMP_BANK is an indicator equal to 1 if 
the headquarters of the borrower is located within a certain distance of the headquarters 
of a credible local lead arranger. Credible local lead arrangers are identified as banks that 
arranged more than 100 deals over the sample period.25
                                                     
25 Credible local lead arrangers identified in this study include ABN AMRO Bank NV, BNP Paribas SA, 
Bank of New York, Bank of Nova Scotia, BankBoston NA, Bankers Trust Co, Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Chemical Bank, Deutsche Bank AG, First Chicago, First Union National Bank, General Electric Capital 
Corp, LaSalle Bank NA, NationsBank, NationsBank of Texas, PNC Bank, SunTrust Bank, Toronto 
Dominion Bank, US Bank NA, Union Bank of California, Wells Fargo Bank, Wells Fargo Bank NA. The 
variable NEAR_COMP_BANK is determined similarly as the variable NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK. Details 
can be found in Appendix A. 
 REVOLVER is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the loan is revolving. COLLATERAL is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the loan is secured with collateral. DEALSIZE is natural logarithm of the total 
value of each deal. MATURITY is the number of years to loan maturity. 
LOAN_SPREAD is natural logarithm of the total annual all-in-spread drawn (in basis 
points) paid for each dollar drawn down under the loan commitment (including fees and 
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interest). PRIORDEAL is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of syndicated 
loans taken by the borrower in Dealscan database. Moreover, various firm-specific 
variables are also controlled. SIZE is natural logarithm of the book value of total asset. 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of total assets. RATING is an 
indicator equal to 1 if the borrower had senior debt rating by S&P at the time of the 
loan’s issuance. Detail definitions of variables are included in Appendix A. 
4.2 Results 
Table 7 demonstrates the results for the association between the trade-off of 
accounting and soft information and the probability of borrowing from reputable banks. 
The estimates on the interaction between HIGH_FFDCV and NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK 
are significantly positive, implying that higher quality accounting information increase 
the probability for a borrower to get a loan arranged by a reputable bank not close to the 
borrower. In other words, the availability of accounting information improves a 
borrower’s information environment by increasing transparency, thereby enabling the 
borrower to engage with a geographically remote reputable bank, who usually grants 
loans to spatially close borrowers that are more efficiently monitored based on soft 
information acquisition, for loan syndications. 
Furthermore, the results for other variables are consistent with those in prior 
literature. For instance, consistent with Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), 
borrowers that are not close to reputable banks are less likely to engage with reputable 
banks for loan syndications. In addition, being close to credible local banks decreases the 
probability that the loan is syndicated by reputable banks. Moreover, reputable banks 
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syndicate loans of firms that are larger, have credit ratings, have engaged in loan 
syndication before and have prior lending relationships with the reputable banks.
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARIES AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Focusing on the syndicated loan market, this paper investigates the extent to 
which lending decisions of lead banks incorporate trade-offs between access to a 
borrower’s soft, internal information and the quality of the borrower’s financial 
accounting information. Building on a substantial finance and economics literature, I use 
the geographic distance between the borrower and the lead bank as a proxy for the bank’s 
access to soft information acquisition. I first investigate in general the trade-off between 
accounting information and lender-borrower geographic distance in syndicated loan 
decisions, and hypothesize that higher quality accounting information creates scope for 
firms to forge lending relationships with geographically remote lenders that would be 
unavailable in the absence of such hard information. Then, I examine the impact of 
information opacity on the trade-off between accounting information and soft information 
in lending decisions. I further hypothesize that the trade-off between accounting quality 
and distance is amplified for borrowers in more opaque information environment. 
The paper is expanded by investigating the extent to which accounting 
information quality facilitates the ability of borrowers without a high reputation bank 
located in their geographic area to transact with a geographically remote reputable lead 
bank. Based on theoretical predictions in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994a, 1994b), I 
hypothesize that, for firms not close to a high reputation bank, higher quality accounting
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information increases the probability that a firm borrows from a geographically remote 
reputable lead bank. All the empirical evidence confirms the predictions above. 
The main insight of this paper is that accounting information plays a crucial role 
in banks’ decision to lend. As emphasized in Armstrong et al. (2010), while the role of 
accounting information in debt contract design has been extensively studied, accounting’s 
role in determining whether or not borrowers can get loans from potential lending banks 
is relatively less explored. They posit that the lack of research in this area partly attributes 
to the difficulty of identifying firms that intent to borrow but fail to engage with a willing 
lender. Focusing on the syndicated loan market, this paper investigates the lending 
decisions of lead banks that incorporate trade-offs between access to a borrower’s soft 
information and the quality of the borrower’s accounting information. It is shown that the 
availability of financial accounting information attenuates the demand for soft 
information in banks’ decision to lend in the syndicated loan market. Overall, the results 
suggest that high quality accounting information increases the set of potential contracting 
counterparties by creating the opportunity for borrowers to transcend the limits of 
geography and seek lending relationships with geographically remote banks.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Description Source 
(1) Key Variables: 
LDISTANCE This is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical 
distance between the headquarters of borrowers and 
the headquarters of the lead arranger of the 
syndicated loan. For foreign lead arrangers, 
domestic headquarters (or representation offices) are 
recognized as the location. Distance is measured as 
follows: 
i. The zip codes of borrowers’ and lead 
arrangers’ location are collected from 
Dealscan, Compustat, company websites, 
FDIC website, and Bloomberg Business 
Week website; 
ii. The corresponding coordinates (latitudes 
and longitudes) for each zip code are 
obtained; 
iii. Distances are calculated (in miles) using 
coordinates of locations by the STATA 
code “globdist”; 
iv. LDISTANCE is defined as the natural log 
of one plus the distance calculated above. 
Dealscan, 
Compustat, 
Company 
website, FDIC 
website, 
Bloomberg 
Business Week 
Website 
   
FFDCV Debt contracting value (DCV) of accounting 
information is measured, at the Fama-French 48 
industry level, as the R-square from the following 
regression: 
∆𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−3+ 𝛽4∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−4 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
∆𝐷𝐿𝐼  is quarterly changes of default likelihood 
indicator (DLI). Detail measure of DLI is shown 
below. ∆𝐸  is seasonally adjusted changes in 
quarterly earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat data: IBQ) scaled by total assets 
(Compustat data: ATQ) at the beginning of the 
period. 
Ball et al. 
(2008), 
Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) 
   
HIGH_FFDCV An indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal 
to sample median. 
/ 
   
TADCV Debt contracting value (DCV) of accounting 
information is measured, at the 45 category level 
grouped by total lagged assets, as the R-square from 
the following regression: 
∆𝐷𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽3∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−3+ 𝛽4∆𝐸𝑖𝑡−4 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
∆𝐷𝐿𝐼  is quarterly changes of default likelihood 
(Ecker et al. 
2011) 
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Variable Name Description Source 
indicator (DLI). Detail measure of DLI is shown 
below. ∆𝐸  is seasonally adjusted changes in 
quarterly earnings before extraordinary items 
(Compustat data: IBQ) scaled by total assets 
(Compustat data: ATQ) at the beginning of the 
period. 
   
TIMELINESS This is measured, at the Fama-French 48 industry 
level,  as the R-square from the following regression 
of stock returns on earnings and change in earnings: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the four-month adjusted stock return ending 
one month after the fiscal quarter t, 𝐸𝑖𝑡 is quarterly 
earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat 
data: IBQ) scaled by total assets (Compustat data: 
ATQ) at the beginning of the period and ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡  is 
seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings 
before extraordinary items scaled by total assets at 
the beginning of the period. 
CRSP, 
Compustat 
   
HIGH_ TIMELINESS An indicator equal to 1 if TIMELINESS is greater 
or equal to sample median. 
/ 
   
NAQ NAQ is negative one times AQ. Following Francis 
et al. (2005), accrual quality (AQ) was measured as 
the firm-level standard deviation of the residuals 
(from year t-4 to year t) from the yearly estimation 
of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model modified 
by McNicoles (2002) for each Fama-French 48 
industry: 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡+1+ 𝛽4∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  
= total current accruals for firm i in year t, where 
∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡  is the change in current assets (Compustat 
data: act), ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the change in current liabilities 
(Compustat data: lct), ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the change in cash 
(Compustat data: che), and ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡  is the 
change in debt in current liabilities (Compustat data: 
dlc). 𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡  = cash flow from 
operations, where 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡  is net income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat data: ib) and 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 −
𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 = total accruals, where 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 is depreciation 
and amortization expense (Compustat data: dp). 
∆𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the change in revenue (Compustat data: 
sale) and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the gross value of Property, Plant 
& Equipment (Compustat data: ppegt). 
Francis et al. 
(2005) 
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Variable Name Description Source 
(2) Deal-Specific Variables: 
PRIOR_LEADER An indicator equal to 1 if the current lead arranger is 
a lead arranger for the borrower in a previous deal. 
Dealscan 
   
REPUTATION An indicator equal to 1 if the ultimate controller of 
the lead arranger is one of the reputable banks in the 
syndicated loan market. Following Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), the lead arranger is 
defined to be reputable if its average market share in 
the primary loan market is above 2 percent. The 
market share is measured by the ratio of the amount 
of loans that the financial intermediary syndicated 
as a lead arranger to the total amount of loans 
syndicated on the primary loan market over the 
period from 1998 to 2006. In the end, J.P. Morgan 
Chase, Bank of America, Citibank, Bank One, Fleet 
Boston, Wachovia, Credit Suisse, First Boston and 
Deutsche Bank are classified as reputable arrangers. 
Bushman and 
Wittenberg-
Moerman 
(2011) 
   
REVOLVER An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is 
revolving. 
Dealscan 
   
COLLATERAL An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is 
secured with collateral. 
Dealscan 
   
DEALSIZE The natural logarithm of the total value of each deal. Dealscan 
   
MATURITY The number of months to loan maturity. Dealscan 
   
PRIORDEAL The natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
syndicated loans taken by the borrower in Dealscan 
database. 
Dealscan 
   
LOAN_SPREAD The natural logarithm of the total annual all-in-drawn spread, equal to the amount the borrower 
pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar 
drawn down (including fees and interest). 
Dealscan 
   
COVENANT The natural logarithm of one plus the total number 
of financial covenants of the loan. 
Dealscan 
   
NOT_NEAR_REP_BA
NK 
An indicator equal to 1 if the headquarters of the 
borrower is not located within a certain distance of 
the headquarters of the lead arranger. The threshold 
is determined as follows: 
i. For each of the reputable lead arrangers 
identified, calculate the distances (in miles) 
between all the borrowers and the lead 
arranger using coordinates of the locations; 
ii. After ranking the distances in deciles, 
/ 
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Variable Name Description Source 
identify the maximum distance in each 
decile; 
iii. Take the mean of the maximum distance in 
each decile across all the reputable lead 
arrangers; 
iv. The mean of the maximum distance in the 
1st decile is the threshold for the 
identification of closeness to reputable lead 
arrangers. 
   
NEAR_COMP_BANK An indicator equal to 1 if the headquarters of the 
borrower is located within a certain distance of the 
headquarters of a credible local lead arranger. 
Credible local lead arrangers are identified as banks 
that arranged more than 100 deals over the sample 
period. The threshold of the distance to define the 
closeness to a credible local lead arranger is 
determined as follows: 
i. For each of the credible local lead arrangers, 
calculate the distances (in miles) between 
all the borrowers and the lead arranger 
using coordinates of the locations; 
ii. After ranking the distances in deciles, 
identify the maximum distance in each 
decile; 
iii. Take the mean of the maximum distance in 
each decile across all the credible local lead 
arrangers; 
iv. The mean of the maximum distance in the 
1st decile is the threshold for the 
identification of closeness to the credible 
local lead arrangers. 
/ 
   
(3) Firm-Specific Variables: 
SIZE The natural logarithm of the book value of total 
asset (Compustat data: ATQ). 
Compustat 
   
LEVERAGE The ratio of long-term debt (Compustat data: 
DLTTQ) to book value of total assets (Compustat 
data: ATQ). 
Compustat 
   
BTM The book-to-market ratio (Compustat data: 
SEQQ/(PRCCQ*CSHOQ)). 
Compustat 
   
ROA Returns on assets equal to the ratio of quarterly 
earnings before extraordinary items to total assets 
(Compustat data: IBQ /ATQ). 
Compustat 
   
INTEREST_COV Interest coverage equal to interest expense plus quarterly earnings before extraordinary items Compustat 
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Variable Name Description Source scaled by interest expense (Compustat data: 
(XINTQ+IBQ)/XINTQ). 
   
INFO_ASY Following Llorente et al. (2002), information 
asymmetry is measured using daily returns and 
trading volume. Daily turnover is used to measure 
trading volume as follows: 
𝑉𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 − 1200 � 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡+𝑠−1
𝑠=−200
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 0.0000225) 
where 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 is the daily turnover (CRSP data: 
NUMTRD/SHROUT). Then, the following 
regression is estimated for each individual stock in 
time series: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛿0𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑖 is the daily return for stock i and the coefficient 
𝛿2𝑖 captures the effect of information asymmetry on 
volume-return relation. Statistically significant 
positive 𝛿2𝑖 should be expected for stocks associated 
with very significant speculative trade, while for 
stocks with predominantly hedge trade, 𝛿2𝑖  should 
be significantly negative. 
Llorente et al. 
(2002) 
   
ANALYST An indicator equal to “1” if the firm has analyst 
following and “0” otherwise.  
I/B/E/S 
   
RATING An indicator equal to 1 if the borrower had senior 
debt rating by S&P (S&P Domestic Long Term 
Issuer Credit Rating) at the time of the loan’s 
issuance. 
Compustat 
   
R&D Research and development expenses scaled by sales 
(Compustat data: XRDQ/SALEQ). 
Compustat 
   
∆DLI According to the analyses in Vassalou and Xing 
(2004), theoretical probability of likelihood is 
defined as: 
𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓 = 𝑁�− ln�𝑉𝐴,𝑡 𝑋𝑡⁄ � + �𝜇 − 12𝜎𝐴2�𝑇
𝜎𝐴√𝑇
� 
𝑉𝐴  is the firm’s asset value with an instantaneous 
drift 𝜇 and an instantaneous volatility 𝜎𝐴 . 𝑋𝑡  is the 
book value of debt, which plays the role of the strike 
price of the call option since the market value of 
equity can be thought of as a call option on 𝑉𝐴 with 
time to expiration equal to 𝑇. Quarterly changes of 
default likelihood indicator is measured monthly at 
firm level. 
Vassalou and 
Xing (2004) 
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Appendix B: Distribution of Bank Headquarters by State in the U.S. and Number of 
Deals Generated by Banks in Each State 
 
 
 
U.S. States Number of Bank Headquarters Number of Deals 
AL 8 36 
AZ 1 8 
CA 34 821 
CO 2 28 
CT 14 97 
DC 3 4 
DE 1 1 
FL 4 11 
GA 6 296 
HI 2 9 
IA 3 5 
IL 36 937 
IN 2 3 
KS 1 1 
LA 4 16 
MA 23 669 
MD 7 64 
MI 25 1586 
MN 8 132 
MO 6 18 
NC 55 4433 
NE 2 6 
NJ 3 9 
NY 210 7260 
OH 24 337 
OK 6 30 
ON 16 396 
OR 1 2 
PA 8 388 
RI 1 1 
SC 1 1 
TN 2 2 
TX 18 125 
UT 1 6 
VA 4 8 
WA 2 4 
WI 4 28 
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Figure I. Distribution of Deals by Borrower-Lender Distance 
 
 
 
The figure shows the distribution of deal observations in each category of borrower-lender distance. The 
borrower-lender distance is measured as the geographic distance between the headquarters of borrowers 
and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. The vertical axis shows the number of 
deals and the horizontal axis indicates distance (in miles) categories.   
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Table I. Sample Selection and Data Distribution 
 
Panel A. Sample Selection Procedure 
      
 
Facilities/Loa
ns Deals Firms   
Samples of syndicated loan 
contracts matched to Compustat 30857 57735 7227   
Samples after excluding financial 
firms 26581 51727 6425   
Samples after requiring loan-
specific variables & the largest 
facility/loan for each deal 
16321 16321 4372   
Samples after requiring distance 
measures 15938 15938 4254   
Samples after requiring accounting 
variables 14063 14063 3973   
      
Panel B. Distribution of Loans by Year 
Year 
Samples of 
syndicated 
loan contracts 
matched to 
Compustat 
Samples 
after 
excludin
g 
financial 
firms 
Samples 
after 
requiring 
loan-
specific 
variables 
& the 
largest 
facility/loa
n for each 
deal 
Samples 
after 
requirin
g 
distance 
measure
s 
Samples 
after 
requiring 
accountin
g 
variables 
      
1982 3 3 0 0 0 
1983 1 1 0 0 0 
1984 5 4 0 0 0 
1985 12 10 0 0 0 
1986 37 34 0 0 0 
1987 249 225 7 7 7 
1988 507 466 16 14 13 
1989 494 458 15 14 12 
1990 539 487 22 20 17 
1991 520 463 43 40 37 
1992 755 670 76 68 61 
1993 928 816 130 124 102 
1994 1461 1227 424 400 355 
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Year 
Samples of 
syndicated 
loan contracts 
matched to 
Compustat 
Samples 
after 
excludin
g 
financial 
firms 
Samples 
after 
requiring 
loan-
specific 
variables 
& the 
largest 
facility/loa
n for each 
deal 
Samples 
after 
requirin
g 
distance 
measure
s 
Samples 
after 
requiring 
accountin
g 
variables 
      
1995 1675 1407 678 649 554 
1996 2096 1762 986 943 818 
1997 2397 2033 1336 1307 1142 
1998 2057 1743 1361 1318 1117 
1999 2072 1788 1362 1330 1160 
2000 2250 1947 1441 1402 1274 
2001 2148 1882 1362 1336 1199 
2002 2078 1785 1360 1345 1180 
2003 2070 1795 1349 1337 1193 
2004 2321 2014 1547 1524 1362 
2005 2162 1846 1504 1478 1318 
2006 2017 1712 1302 1282 1142 
      
Total 30857 26581 16321 15938 14063 
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Table II. Statistical Descriptive 
 
Panel A. Distribution of Borrower-Lender Distance (in miles)  
 No. of Observation Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Distance 13749 617.08 802.98 689.74 
By Quintile:     
1st 2748 39.09 64.32 58.82 
2nd 2751 324.58 328.45 89.37 
3rd 2750 617.08 626.35 85.86 
4th  2750 1002.99 1051.51 179.84 
5th 2750 1973.92 1943.91 402.63 
 
Panel B. Distribution of Deal-Specific and Firm-Specific Variables 
Variable No. of Observation Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Key Variables:     
LDISTANCE 13749 6.43 6.05 1.50 
FFDCV 13867 0.06 0.30 0.59 
Deal-specific Variables:     
PRIOR_LEADER 14063 1 0.97 0.18 
REPUTATION 14063 1 0.54 0.50 
REVOLVER 14063 1 0.55 0.50 
COLLATERAL 14063 0 0.19 0.39 
DEALSIZE ($ millions) 14063 220 493 939 
MATURITY (month) 12813 45 43 25 
PRIORDEAL (number) 14063 3.00 3.66 3.19 
LOAN_SPREAD (bp) 12671 135 161 127 
COVENANTS (number) 14063 1 1.37 1.42 
NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK 14063 1 0.68 0.47 
NEAR_COMP_BANK 14063 1 0.59 0.49 
Firm-specific Variables:     
SIZE ($ millions) 13695 1,226 5,941 19,994 
LEVERAGE 13556 0.27 0.29 0.21 
BTM 12023 0.46 0.49 0.92 
ROA 13654 0.01 0.01 0.06 
INTEREST_COV 12579 2.45 6.13 19.13 
RATING 14063 1 0.59 0.49 
 
LDISTANCE is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between the headquarters of 
borrowers and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. FFDCV is the industry-level 
debt contracting value of accounting information measured at the Fama-French 49 industry level as the R-
square from regressions of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted 
changes in quarterly earnings. Detail definitions of variables are included in Appendix A. 
  
 
Table III. Pearson (above)/Spearman (below) Correlation 
 
Panel A. Key Variables vs. Deal-specific Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) LDISTANCE 1 0.0062 0.0450 0.0929 -0.0165 0.0373 0.0488 0.0369 0.0404 0.0511 
(2) HIGH_FFDCV 0.0199 1 -0.0149 -0.0130 0.0487 0.0698 0.0610 0.1258 -0.0386 0.0944 
(3) PRIOR_LEADER 0.0320 -0.0149 1 0.1337 0.0018 -0.0243 0.1296 -0.0020 0.0493 -0.0784 
(4) REPUTATION 0.0561 -0.0130 0.1337 1 -0.0198 -0.0189 0.2408 -0.0919 0.2286 -0.1732 
(5) REVOLVER -0.0289 0.0487 0.0018 -0.0198 1 0.0956 -0.0882 0.4135 -0.0913 0.0133 
(6) COLLATERAL 0.0295 0.0698 -0.0243 -0.0189 0.0956 1 -0.1030 0.2292 -0.0191 0.4730 
(7) DEALSIZE 0.0497 0.0533 0.1197 0.2377 -0.0928 -0.0966 1 0.0420 0.3297 -0.4079 
(8) MATURITY 0.0318 0.1321 0.0076 -0.0773 0.2680 0.2100 0.1111 1 -0.1277 0.2086 
(9) PRIORDEAL 0.0212 -0.0348 0.0502 0.2268 -0.0883 -0.0151 0.3290 -0.0969 1 -0.1981 
(10) LOAN_SPREAD 0.0493 0.0988 -0.0809 -0.1749 -0.0100 0.4861 -0.3900 0.1757 -0.1955 1 
 
Panel B. Key Variables vs. Firm-specific Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1) LDISTANCE 1 0.0062 0.0488 0.0536 0.0052 -0.0083 -0.0256 0.0548 
(2) HIGH_FFDCV 0.0199 1 -0.0741 0.1041 -0.0316 -0.0121 -0.0217 -0.0048 
(3) SIZE 0.0561 -0.0779 1 0.0339 -0.0448 0.0627 -0.0359 0.6107 
(4) LEVERAGE 0.0650 0.0815 0.0796 1 -0.0252 -0.0641 -0.2846 0.2317 
(5) BTM 0.0403 -0.0352 -0.0746 0.0210 1 0.1069 -0.0190 -0.0384 
(6) ROA -0.0273 -0.0499 0.0343 -0.2620 -0.2616 1 0.2825 0.0278 
(7) INTEREST_COV -0.0505 -0.0607 0.0747 -0.4359 -0.2098 0.9058 1 -0.1089 
(8) RATING 0.0553 -0.0048 0.6278 0.2645 -0.0528 -0.0215 -0.0480 1 
 
 Detail definitions of variables are included in Appendix A. Bold numbers indicate significance at the 1% level or lower based on a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table IV. OLS Estimation of the Relation between Distance and 
Accounting Information 
 
Panel A. Debt Contracting Value of Accounting Information 
 HIGH_FFDCV  TADCV 
 Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
Intercept 4.4012 *** 6.71  3.1212 *** 6.06 
Accounting 1.8138 *** 14.21  0.2113 * 1.98 
REPUTATION 0.3072 *** 6.02  0.3349 *** 5.73 
PRIOR_LEADER 0.3512 ** 2.59  0.5965 *** 4.15 
REVOLVER -0.0222  -0.58  -0.0199  -0.27 
COLLATERAL 0.0786  1.89  0.0709  1.45 
DEALSIZE 0.0573 * 2.17  0.0570  1.88 
PRIORDEAL -0.0009  -0.04  0.0394  1.87 
LOAN_SPREAD 0.0755  1.54  0.2080 *** 5.63 
COVENANT -0.0683  -1.72  -0.0941 ** -2.36 
SIZE -0.0437  -1.42  0.0023  0.10 
LEVERAGE 0.0096  0.05  0.1846  1.45 
BTM 0.0128  0.57  0.0072  0.34 
ROA 0.4248  1.01  0.6763  1.13 
INTEREST_COV -0.0016  -1.69  -0.0007  -0.61 
        
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
4-Digit SIC Fixed Effect Yes  No 
R-square 0.2370  0.0407 
Number of observation 9,339  6,319 
 
The dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between 
the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. 
HIGH_FFDCV is an indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median. FFDCV is the 
industry-level debt contracting value of accounting information measured at the Fama-French 48 industry 
level as the R-square from regressions of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged 
seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. TADCV is the debt contracting value of accounting 
information measured by 45 categories grouped by lagged total assets as the R-square from regressions of 
the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly 
earnings. Detail definitions of all the variables are included in Appendix A. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 
5%, 1% level respectively. The regression for HIGH_FFDCV is clustered by Fama-French 48 industry and 
the regression for TADCV is clustered by 45 categories grouped by lagged total assets. 
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Table IV. OLS Estimation of the Relation between Distance and 
Accounting Information 
 
Panel B. Industry-Level and Firm-Level Accounting Measures  
 HIGH_ TIMELINESS  NAQ 
 Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
Intercept 4.6207 *** 6.51  0.8432  0.85 
Accounting 2.1396 *** 2.28  0.0063 *** 2.87 
REPUTATION 0.3019 *** 5.67  0.3779 *** 4.36 
PRIOR_LEADER 0.3210 ** 2.44  -0.0052  -0.02 
REVOLVER -0.0132  -0.41  0.0316  0.38 
COLLATERAL 0.0168  0.48  0.0616  0.65 
DEALSIZE 0.0620 ** 2.53  -0.0216  -0.39 
PRIORDEAL -0.0085  -0.42  0.0894  1.70 
LOAN_SPREAD 0.0782 ** 2.40  0.1681 * 2.22 
COVENANT -0.0771 *** -2.73  -0.1342  -1.78 
SIZE -0.0325  -1.27  0.0749  1.21 
LEVERAGE 0.1329  0.87  -0.2213  -0.69 
BTM -0.0068  -0.41  -0.0370  -0.68 
ROA 0.4183  1.04  3.8128 ** 2.50 
INTEREST_COV -0.0014  -1.71  -0.0013  -0.90 
        
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes  
Yes 
4-Digit SIC Fixed Effect Yes  
Yes 
R-square 0.5042  0.3861 
Number of observation 9339  1712 
 
The dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between 
the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. HIGH_ 
TIMELINESS is an indicator equal to 1 if TIMELINESS is greater or equal to sample median. 
TIMELINESS is an equity market based earnings quality measure estimated at the Fama-French 48 
industry level as the R-square from regressions of market-adjusted returns on quarterly earnings levels and 
seasonally differenced quarterly earnings. NAQ is -1 times AQ, which is estimated as the firm-level 
standard deviation of residuals from the cross-sectional estimation of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
modified by McNichols (2002). Detail definitions of all the variables are included in Appendix A. *, **, 
*** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. The regression for HIGH_TIMELINESS is clustered by 
Fama-French 48 industry and that for NAQ is clustered by firm. 
  
 
Table V. OLS Estimation of the Relation between Distance and Accounting Information Conditional on 
Information Asymmetry 
 
Panel A. Equity-Based Measure, Firm Size, Number of Prior Deals as Proxies 
 INFO_ASY 
 
SIZE 
 
PRIORDEAL 
 Higher  Lower Small  Large Small  Large 
 β  t  β  t β  t  β  t β  t  β  t 
Intercept 2.0774 ** 2.14  5.5430 *** 4.79  3.1696 *** 4.22  6.6145 *** 6.67  3.6045 *** 4.66  5.3886 *** 7.15 
HIGH_FFDCV 2.8213 *** 7.76  -0.2612  -1.66  2.0713 *** 13.33  -0.9270 *** -4.42  2.1726 *** 16.21  0.8998 ** 2.39 
REPUTATION 0.3166 ** 2.69  0.2721  1.69  0.3769 *** 5.62  0.1955 ** 2.74  0.4167 *** 6.84  0.1788 ** 2.65 
PRIOR_LEADER 0.4819 ** 2.65  0.4663  1.66  0.4421 *** 2.97  0.0986  0.48  0.4881 ** 2.51  0.2067  1.28 
REVOLVER -0.0168  -0.24  0.0097  0.11  0.0291  0.40  -0.0176  -0.37  -0.0211  -0.47  -0.0156  -0.30 
COLLATERAL -0.1856 ** -2.69  0.1642  1.28  0.0563  1.11  0.0992  1.28  0.0915  1.41  0.0785  1.19 
DEALSIZE 0.0825  1.68  -0.0107  -0.15  0.0981 ** 2.78  0.0205  0.62  0.0546  1.76  0.0586  1.72 
PRIORDEAL 0.0595  1.65  -0.0040  -0.07  -0.0423  -1.32  0.0290  0.73  -0.0193  -0.42  0.0213  0.32 
LOAN_SPREAD 0.1298  1.47  0.0244  0.23  0.0809  1.45  0.0575  0.99  0.0857  1.69  0.0719  1.08 
COVENANTS -0.0414  -0.48  -0.1493  -1.51  -0.0981  -1.74  -0.0247  -0.46  -0.1085 ** -2.43  -0.0483  -0.89 
SIZE 0.0416  0.95  -0.0279  -0.26  -0.0330  -0.60  -0.1049  -1.53  -0.0478  -1.43  -0.0451  -1.02 
LEVERAGE -0.0934  -0.37  0.6008  1.87  0.1501  1.05  -0.4371  -1.02  0.1668  0.91  -0.1311  -0.49 
BTM 0.0031  0.05  0.0299  0.74  0.0225  0.70  -0.0004  -0.01  0.0214  0.78  0.0074  0.27 
ROA 0.2483  0.47  0.8999  1.30  0.6070  1.25  0.2242  0.20  0.5851  1.19  0.3225  0.46 
INTEREST_COV -0.0008  -0.45  -0.0002  -0.11  -0.0010  -0.72  -0.0034  -1.31  -0.0017  -1.42  -0.0022  -1.57 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4-Digit SIC Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-square 0.4309  0.3845  0.2414  0.3605  0.2480  0.2975 
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Number of Observations 1969  1880  4663  4676  4218  5121 
Chow Test: HIGH_FFDCV                       
Chi-square statistics 10.75***  29.73***  44.53*** 
 
The dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of 
the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. HIGH_FFDCV is an indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median. FFDCV is the industry-level 
debt contracting value of accounting information measured at the Fama-French 48 industry level as the R-square from regressions of the changes in default 
likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. Following Llorente et al. (2002), INFO_ASY is measured using daily 
returns and trading volume. Then, the following regression is estimated for each individual stock in time series: Rit+1 = δ0i + δ1iRit + δ2iVitRit + εit, where Ri 
is the daily return for stock i and the coefficient δ2i captures the effect of information asymmetry on volume-return relation. Statistically significant positive δ2i 
should be expected for stocks associated with very significant speculative trade, while for stocks with predominantly hedge trade, δ2i should be significantly 
negative. Observations are classified into the “larger (smaller) SIZE” group if their SIZE is larger (smaller) than sample median. SIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the book value of total asset. Observations are classified into the “smaller (larger) SIZE” group if their SIZE is smaller (larger) than sample median. 
PRIORDEAL is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of syndicated loans taken by the borrower in Dealscan database. Observations are classified into 
the “smaller (larger) PRIORDEAL” group if their PRIORDEAL is smaller (larger) than sample median. Detail definitions of all the variables are included in 
Appendix A. Chow tests are performed to compare the coefficients on HIGH_FFDCV across groups that are partitioned based on information asymmetry proxies. 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Clustered by Fama-French 48 industry. 54 
  
 
Table V. OLS Estimation of the Relation between Distance and Accounting Transparency Conditional on 
Information Asymmetry 
 
Panel B. R&D Expenses, Credit Rating and Analyst Following as Proxies 
 R&D 
 
RATING 
 
ANALYST 
 With  Without Without  With Without  With 
 β  t  β  t Β  t  β  t β  t  β  t 
Intercept 2.8637  1.60 
 4.4017 *** 6.44  1.9783 ** 2.49  6.3252 *** 8.36  4.5313 *** 4.27  4.1062 *** 5.09 
HIGH_FFDCV 3.6908 *** 12.15  1.8132 *** 14.15  2.1735 *** 25.77  1.1290 *** 6.66  1.2202 *** 5.92  0.3688 *** 4.39 
REPUTATION 0.3082 * 2.01  0.3021 *** 6.06  0.4133 *** 4.83  0.2303 *** 3.13  0.2075 * 2.13  0.3422 *** 5.60 
PRIOR_LEADER 0.8455 * 2.02  0.2746 * 2.00  0.3381 * 2.12  0.2656  1.28 
 0.6716 *** 3.44  0.2514  1.45 
REVOLVER -0.0152  -0.15 
 -0.0272  -0.61 
 0.0276  0.42 
 -0.0404  -0.92 
 -0.0196  -0.28 
 -0.0220  -0.51 
COLLATERAL 0.0431  0.31 
 0.0827  1.81 
 0.0077  0.11 
 0.0708  0.98 
 0.0934  1.17 
 0.0681  0.98 
DEALSIZE 0.0921  1.20 
 0.0592 ** 2.34  0.1078 * 2.98  0.0212  0.69 
 0.0619  1.32 
 0.0416  1.13 
PRIORDEAL 0.0709  1.11 
 -0.0156  -0.50 
 0.0002  0.00 
 -0.0079  -0.20 
 -0.0115  -0.23 
 0.0259  0.72 
LOAN_SPREAD 0.0484  0.34 
 0.0684  1.29 
 0.0992  1.64 
 0.0769  1.30 
 0.0972  1.33 
 0.0981  1.81 
COVENANTS -0.1794  -1.59 
 -0.0641  -1.47 
 -0.1216  -1.69 
 -0.0391  -0.81 
 -0.0785  -1.03 
 -0.0550  -1.39 
SIZE -0.1224  -1.20 
 -0.0325  -1.07 
 -0.0597  -1.27 
 -0.0814  -1.82 
 -0.0439  -0.76 
 -0.0118  -0.30 
LEVERAGE 0.3869  1.21 
 -0.0159  -0.08 
 0.1420  0.86 
 -0.3872  -1.25 
 -0.0060  -0.03 
 -0.0219  -0.12 
BTM 0.0029  0.07 
 0.0085  0.33 
 0.0262  0.83 
 0.0021  0.08 
 -0.0144  -0.54 
 0.0936 ** 2.88 
ROA 1.7607 *** 3.94  0.1295  0.33 
 1.1252 * 2.15  0.1721  0.33 
 0.3655  0.67 
 0.3586  0.40 
INTEREST_COV -0.0034 ** -2.41  -0.0008  -0.57 
 -0.0008  -0.89 
 -0.0031  -1.16 
 -0.0017  -0.93 
 -0.0012  -1.10 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4-Digit SIC Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
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R-square 0.3512  0.5076  0.2609  0.3188  0.3755  0.2879 
Number of Observations 1680  7659  3593  5746  2860  6479 
Chow Test: HIGH_FFDCV                       
Chi-square statistics 43.45***  116.05***  9.38*** 
The dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of 
the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. HIGH_FFDCV is an indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median. FFDCV is the industry-level 
debt contracting value of accounting information measured at the Fama-French 48 industry level as the R-square from regressions of the changes in default 
likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. R&D is research and development expenses scaled by sales. Observations 
are classified into “with R&D” group if they have R&D expenses, and into “without R&D” group if they do not have R&D expenses. Rating is an indicator equal 
to 1 if the borrower had senior debt rating by S&P (S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit Rating) at the time of the loan’s issuance. Observations are classified 
into “without Rating” group if they do not have S&P credit ratings, and into “with Rating” group if they  have S&P credit ratings. ANALYST is an indicator 
equal to “1” if the firm has analyst following and “0” otherwise. Detail definitions of all the variables are included in Appendix A. Chow tests are performed to 
compare the coefficients on HIGH_FFDCV across groups that are partitioned based on information asymmetry proxies. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% 
level respectively. Clustered by Fama-French 48 industry. 
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Table VI. Alternative Estimations of the Relation between Distance and 
Accounting Information 
 
Panel A. Borrower’s State and Lender’s Zip Code Fixed Effects 
 Firm's State  Bank's Zip Code  State & Zip Code 
 β  t  β  t  β  t 
Intercept 4.5750 *** 6.50  3.3409 *** 2.05  3.3020  1.91 
HIGH_FFDCV 0.3360 ** 2.42  1.9325 *** 10.04  0.4676 ** 2.62 
REPUTATION 0.3030 *** 5.71  0.3823 *** 3.40  0.3093 *** 3.10 
PRIOR_LEADER 0.3220 ** 2.44  0.3063 ** 2.42  0.2415 ** 2.30 
REVOLVER -0.0148  -0.46  -0.0002  0.00  -0.0037  -0.11 
COLLATERAL 0.0185  0.53  0.0584  1.53  0.0099  0.27 
DEALSIZE 0.0621 ** 2.54  0.0408  1.46  0.0285  1.15 
PRIORDEAL -0.0067  -0.33  -0.0137  -0.57  -0.0215  -1.11 
LOAN_SPREAD 0.0781 ** 2.42  0.0557  1.03  0.0484  1.39 
COVENANTS -0.0762 ** -2.69  -0.0568  -1.51  -0.0641 * -2.28 
SIZE -0.0218  -0.95  -0.0493  -1.80  -0.0361  -1.73 
LEVERAGE 0.1596  1.05  -0.0501  -0.25  0.1214  0.78 
BTM -0.0067  -0.40  0.0147  0.67  -0.0054  -0.33 
ROA 0.4169  1.03  0.4432  0.94  0.4343  1.09 
INTEREST_COV -0.0015  -1.83  -0.0016  -1.87  -0.0014 * -2.15 
    
 
   
 
   
Firm's State Fixed Effect Yes  No  Yes 
Bank's Zip Code Fixed Effect No  Yes  Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
4-Digit SIC Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-square 0.5040  0.3013  0.5532 
Number of Observations 9339  9339  9339 
 
The dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between 
the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. 
HIGH_FFDCV is an indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median. FFDCV is the 
industry-level debt contracting value of accounting information measured at the Fama-French 48 industry 
level as the R-square from regressions of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged 
seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. Detail definitions of all the variables are included in 
Appendix A. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Regression for HIGH_FFDCV is 
clustered by Fama-French 48 industry. 
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Table VI. Alternative Estimations of the Relation between Distance and 
Accounting Information 
 
Panel B. Banks Located in New York 
 NY Banks  Non-NY Banks 
 Estimate  t-statistics  Estimate  t-statistics 
Intercept 6.4487 *** 6.79 
 
2.1415 *** 3.47 
HIGH_FFDCV 1.0485 *** 5.88 
 
3.6583 *** 15.74 
REPUTATION 0.0128  0.13  
0.4524 *** 7.48 
PRIOR_LEADER -0.0077 
 
-0.06 
 
0.6073 *** 3.40 
REVOLVER -0.0579 
 
-0.99 
 
0.0133  0.24 
COLLATERAL 0.1510 
 
1.66 
 
0.0618  1.20 
DEALSIZE 0.0686 
 
1.53 
 
0.0373  1.45 
PRIORDEAL -0.0201 
 
-0.39 
 
0.0266  0.67 
LOAN_SPREAD -0.0199 
 
-0.23 
 
0.1200 ** 2.79 
COVENANTS -0.0385 
 
-0.58 
 
-0.0793  -1.93 
SIZE -0.0914 
 
-1.78 
 
0.0206  0.80 
LEVERAGE -0.4910  -1.62 
 
0.2509  1.89 
BTM -0.0209  -0.58 
 
0.0464 * 2.14 
ROA 1.0592  1.35  
0.6219  1.31 
INTEREST_COV -0.0023  -1.22  
-0.0007  -0.66 
    
 
   
Year Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
4-Digit SIC Fixed Effect Yes  Yes 
R-square 0.4064  0.2649 
Number of Observations 3675  5664 
 
The dependent variable, LDISTANCE, is the natural logarithm of one plus the physical distance between 
the headquarters of borrowers and the headquarters of the lead arranger of the syndicated loan. 
HIGH_FFDCV is an indicator equal to 1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median. FFDCV is the 
industry-level debt contracting value of accounting information measured at the Fama-French 48 industry 
level as the R-square from regressions of the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged 
seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly earnings. Detail definitions of all the variables are included in 
Appendix A.*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Regression for HIGH_FFDCV is 
clustered by Fama-French 48 industry. 
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Table VII. Probit Regression for the Probability of Obtaining Loans 
from Reputable Banks 
 
 Marginal Effects  Z-Statistics 
    
HIGH_FFDCV -0.1004  -0.99 
NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK -0.0865 *** -4.74 
HIGH_FFDCV*NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK 0.0720 *** 2.83 
PRIOR_LEADER 0.3236 *** 9.77 
NEAR_COMP_BANK -0.0451 *** -3.25 
REVOLVER 0.0237 * 1.87 
COLLATERAL -0.0660 *** -4.88 
DEALSIZE 0.0435 *** 6.27 
MATURITY 0.0017  0.19 
LOAN_SPREAD -0.0352 *** -3.87 
PRIORDEAL 0.0286 *** 3.71 
SIZE 0.0392 *** 6.40 
LEVERAGE -0.0607 ** -2.15 
RATING 0.0213 * 1.78 
  
  
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Deal Purpose Fixed Effect Yes 
Fama-French 48 Industry Fixed Effect Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1720 
Number of observations 11,219 
 
The dependent variable, REPUTATION, is an indicator equal to 1 if the ultimate controller of the lead 
arranger is one of the reputable banks in the syndicated loan market. HIGH_FFDCV is an indicator equal to 
1 if FFDCV is greater or equal to sample median. FFDCV is the industry-level debt contracting value of 
accounting information measured at the Fama-French 48 industry level as the R-square from regressions of 
the changes in default likelihood indicator (DLI) on lagged seasonally adjusted changes in quarterly 
earnings. NOT_NEAR_REP_BANK is an indicator equal to 1 if the headquarters of the borrower is not 
located within a certain distance of the headquarters of the lead arranger. The threshold is determined as 
follows: (1) For each of the reputable lead arrangers identified, calculate the distances (in miles) between 
all the borrowers and the lead arranger using coordinates of the locations ; (2) After ranking the distances in 
deciles, identify the maximum distance in each decile; (3) Take the mean of the maximum distance in each 
decile across all the reputable lead arrangers ; (4) The mean of the maximum distance in the 1st decile is the 
threshold for the identification of closeness to reputable lead arrangers. Detail definitions of all the 
variables are included in Appendix A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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